THE INDEPENDENT MAGAZINE FOR LEGAL PROFESSIONALS
feature archives
offsite links


 

 



Class Actions - A narrowing divide between the UK and US?

There has been a great deal in the media recently commenting, in almost universally critical terms, about the excesses of the US "compensation culture" and the dangerous precedent this may set for the UK


Prince Charles, in one of his leaked letters to the Lord Chancellor, complained that the relatively recent extension of human rights law and, what he sees as the associated rise of US-style litigiousness in the UK, is "a threat to the ability of a society to function in a balanced way, which alone can safeguard truly civilised values." How a wider application of basic human rights can be seen as uncivilized is unclear. Nonetheless, this intrinsically conservative desire to maintain a "balanced way" seems to be widely held in the UK, even by those who benefit to a far lesser extent from the current status quo than Prince Charles.

Few people have argued that this US compensation culture is positive and should be viewed as a sign of a healthy society whose citizens are knowledgeable about their rights and are sufficiently empowered in the majority of instances to ensure that they are not breached. This is certainly a view that we hold and tire of instances both here and in the US of people arguing against this armed with a list of well-publicised exceptions.

Why is FRA qualified to comment on a) why US style compensation is not bad per se and b) why the current UK system is letting so many people down? We are an Anglo-Amercian company providing litigation support to parties involved in complex and often multi-party litigation. Typically, we work with plaintiffs and their lawyers in building classes of plaintiffs, calculating the optimal settlement amount and subsequently designing, building and implementing claims validation and processing systems. In short, our systems ensure that legal victories translate into prompt and equitable compensation for victims. This is an established business area in the US but is still in its infancy in the UK - in fact we are not aware of any other company offering comparable services in the UK. We have been operating in both the UK and the US for the past 3 years - probably two of the most complicated actions we are currently involved in are in fact US sourced:

  • the DEM10 billion German Slave Labour Holocaust settlement; and
  • the USD1.25 billion Swiss Bank settlement.

For the German Slave Labour project, our systems have provided the infrastructure to pay out USD 500million in compensation to over 120,000 victims since August 2001 In the UK we are building systems to manage Part-time Workers Pensions Access claims and we have been instrumental in establishing the John Palmer action group which plans to secure compensation for several thousand timeshare fraud victims.

To date, our experience in the US has been markedly different to that in the UK. The UK legal infrastructure does not have a good history of turning legal victories into mass compensation awards - in short it is usually difficult to provide the necessary impetus and structure required to facilitate real access to justice in such cases - i.e. making sure that the all eligible victims receive compensation cost effectively. Whilst of course there have been claims that have succeeded, there has been a long history of failed mass actions in the British Courts. The list starts withthe Benzodiazapine litigation (£40M spent on legal aid and not a single person paid out) and continues through severalother failed claims where tens of millions of Pounds of legal and administrative fees have yet to translate into meaningful compensation payments despite several years of work. These include:

  • Vibration White Finger
  • Asbestos - both the public sector old British Coal liabilities and the successful private sector actions e.g Iron Trades and Cape
  • Pharmaceutical

Equally, the self-regulation and occasional fine put in place regarding instances of financial insitution misconduct (e.g. pensions misselling, can one really argue that the compensation paid out really reflects the profits made from this practice?) seem at best half baked and provide little comfort that the growing list of wide-scale misconduct will be dealt with in any sensible, cost-effective or equitable way - e.g.

  • Mortgage endowments
  • Split Caps
  • Guaranteed Income bonds

It appears primarily that mass litigation in the UK tends not to be commercially driven - or perhaps better put, end-driven; the end being the successful claimant receiving equitable compensation rather than a positive judgementAfter all, claimants sue for money and not for being proven right. In the US this is certainly the case, as the lawyers' fees in a class action are usually structured as a percentage of the award amount and as such the lawyers interests are significantly aligned with those of the plaintiff. Equally, costs are borne by each side so it is in the interests of the lawyers to keep their own costs under control and spend their time and resources as effectively as possible. Some might argue that this will encourage lawyers to pursue opportunitistic claims using opportunistic methods. But remunerating lawyersbased purely upon the hours worked rather than the result achieved (incl. "no win no fee" or legal aid arrangements) does not in itself preclude this sort of behaviour.

 

Other reasons include:

  • An institutional dislike of "litigiousness" amongst many lawyers and policy makers. There is a fairly strong feeling in government that "too many people claim for too much" in the US, and that this is a road down which we do not want to travel;
  • The strong influence of the general insurers. As everyone realises, and only in part as a result of their own doing, general insurance is going through a torrid time at the moment because (a) their investments have suffered with the falls in the stock market, and (b) the number of people making claims (especially in the personal injury market) has grown vastly in recent years. Whilst there is no doubt that the vast majority of these claims are genuine, the effect on the insurance companies of the rise of "no win, no fee" claims has been to increase their exposures greatly (and in many cases for old claims the insurers thought they could put behind them). They have little choice (except when solvency rules are relaxed) but to pass these increased costs on to their policyholders via premium hikes. Insurers also have a natural inclination to blame increasing claims rather than bad investment returns and/or management for these premium rate increases. Thus, the Department of Trade and Industry (which represents both the insurers along with the Treasury and the businesses who pay premiums) and the Department of Transport (which represents the premium paying motorists) are heavy lobbyists against any measures which could increase civil claims;
  • The Government also has an interest in discouraging or at least not assisting class actions as it has significant exposure in a number of areas - both direct liabilities - e.g. MOD personal injury claims, asbestos, army pensions, Gurkha equal pay, SERPs, Expat Pensions, Widowers Benefits, Railtrack and indirect ones where, for example, it may allegedly have failed in its regulatory duties (split caps, Equitable Life, Independent Insurance ….);
  • The inherent conservatism of the legal profession - most lawyers, especially the more reputable ones, would say they have no need to work on a contingency basis. Furthermore, legal aid is still available to certain cases where a wider public good is recognized - however lawyers are neither incentivised nor obliged to ensure that this "wider good" is attained in the event of success. Furthermore, partnerships are poor structures for managing risks (especially potential contingent liabilities such as adverse costs), barristers are rarely in position to run a portfolio of cases which could enable them to absorb more risky/contingency based fee structures. Additionally, UK lawyers - unlike their US cousins - do not have the in-house resources to cope with the logistics of mass claims and/or are not used to outsourcing this work to experts like us;
  • Few firms (if any) to date have had real success in attaining a financially meaningful class action victory and those firms most active in this area have tended to be an instrument for pursuing smaller (i.e. hundreds rather than tens of thousands) personal injury or discrimination cases. It is interesting to note that in the US the class action market was kick-started by securities actions (debt and shareholder) and this market has yet to take off in the UK. True, the Railtrack class action could set a precedent if successful with nearly 50,000 members signed up - but even here it seems to the outsider that this is being driven as much by a dislike of Stephen Byers, together with a strong feeling of being short-changed, rather than a calculated decision that a class action is a sensible commercial punt - i.e. the investment required over a given period versus the potential return in the event of success justifies the speculative risk of litigation. This is, of course, not a refection on the legal merits of that particular case, nor indeed any other, but rather a comment on the differences between the UK securities class action lawyer and his US counterpart, who would be focused entirely on returns and as such would be prepared to fund the action as required in-house;
  • Lack of external funding. The fact that the law of champerty precludes third party funding reduces significantly the ability of lawyers to act commercially (including syndicating risk) or for claimants to pursue actions using money other than their own. Even "no fee no win" agreements leave uncovered and expensive costs (insurance, counsel, expert and court fees) to be met;
  • The willingness of the British public to put up with abuse without seeking recourse or compensation except in exceptional or very obvious circumstances. This is not helped by the difficulty in identifying and getting potential class members to opt in to group actions and the fear of adverse cost exposure. No better example of this exists that the current mortgage endowment misselling debacle - we are met with almost total disbelief when we describe the current situation to a US class action lawyers and point out that no serious legal action has yet been instigated in the UK.

Some may argue that the lack of US-style litigousness in the UK is a good thing - arguments such as this are often supported by much favoured but misleading (because these are the exceptions and not the rules) examples of excessive awards across the Atlantic. The very specific issue of punitive damages is often the most frequent point of focus for British detractors. This attitude frequently leads to sophistry - e.g. a woman in the US is awarded $28 billion compensation for smoking-related diseases - therefore all US-style or even mass compensation is bad.

There is no question in my mind, as someone who works on both sides of the Atlantic on complex mass claims, that US citizens have far better access to justice than their UK counterparts and that US companies, accordingly, are better at handling their liabilities (both after the event and pre-emptively) - which must be a good thing. If we do feel that increasing access to justice in UK is a good idea for genuine victims as opposed to opportunists, what we need to do is look at the US system with an open mind and analyse how it is possible in the UK to reduce the administrative costs associated with compensation claims by ensuring that actions and their settlements are properly managed.

It is possible to do this, to an extent, using the existing infrastructure in the UK as evidenced by our role in the John Palmer action (www.irwinmitchell.co.uk) which has the key characteristics that make a mass action viable in the UK - i.e.:

  • sufficient number of identifiable victims (potentially 17,000);
  • clear case of liability;
  • clear commercial logic both for the victims, the lawyers and FRA; and
  • a well funded defendant - i.e. one who can afford to pay compensation.

We see that similar opportunities exist in the UK especially in securities class actions (as per the Railtrack action) where the claimant population can be identified via the share/bond-holder registry, where the defendants are in sufficient numbers to mitigate/minimize adverse costs exposure and where the defendants themselves are creditworthy and/or have insurance.

In summary, the UK is a long way from the US and all too often genuine victims cannot afford to pursue genuine cases. A good example of this is the Annette Carson case where, to a layman, it would appear that a strong case exists against the Government - i.e. ex-patriot pensioners should have their pensions universally indexed as opposed to selectively and based purely upon their current country of residence. In this case Mrs. Carson is, I assume, a rather underfunded (especially so as her pension is not indexed!) South African-based pensioner fighting the rather better funded UK Government. Having lost the first court case, she was hit with a GBP160,000 adverse costs award - she has thankfully been given the right to appeal. Given that there are an estimated ½ million people in Mrs. Carson's position one would think there is strength in numbers as well as in the principles of her legal case - surely "civilized values" would dictate that Mrs. Carson's case should be pursued on a more level playing field.

 

 


Toby Duthie is one of the three co-founders of FRA. Projects he has or continues to be involved in include:

  • The multi-billion pound Part-time Workers Pensions access project where he is working with Unison to manage several thousand claims.
  • The USD1.25 billion "Nazi Gold" Swiss Bank Settlement where FRA developed and implemented to IT systems required to value, validate and payout up to 30,000 claims in respect of Holocaust-era assets.
   
Search WWW Search The Barrister