Prince Charles, in one
of his leaked letters to the Lord Chancellor, complained that
the relatively recent extension of human rights law and, what
he sees as the associated rise of US-style litigiousness in
the UK, is "a threat to the ability of a society to function
in a balanced way, which alone can safeguard truly civilised values."
How a wider application of basic human rights can be seen as uncivilized
is unclear. Nonetheless, this intrinsically conservative desire
to maintain a "balanced way" seems to be widely held
in the UK, even by those who benefit to a far lesser extent from
the current status quo than Prince Charles.
Few people have argued
that this US compensation culture is positive and should be viewed
as a sign of a healthy society whose citizens are knowledgeable
about their rights and are sufficiently empowered in the majority
of instances to ensure that they are not breached. This is certainly
a view that we hold and tire of instances both here and in the
US of people arguing against this armed with a list of well-publicised
exceptions.
Why is FRA qualified to
comment on a) why US style compensation is not bad per se and
b) why the current UK system is letting so many people down? We
are an Anglo-Amercian company providing litigation support to
parties involved in complex and often multi-party litigation.
Typically, we work with plaintiffs and their lawyers in building
classes of plaintiffs, calculating the optimal settlement amount
and subsequently designing, building and implementing claims validation
and processing systems. In short, our systems ensure that legal
victories translate into prompt and equitable compensation for
victims. This is an established business area in the US but is
still in its infancy in the UK - in fact we are not aware of any
other company offering comparable services in the UK. We have
been operating in both the UK and the US for the past 3 years
- probably two of the most complicated actions we are currently
involved in are in fact US sourced:
- the DEM10 billion
German Slave Labour Holocaust settlement; and
- the USD1.25 billion
Swiss Bank settlement.
For
the German Slave Labour project, our systems have provided
the infrastructure to pay out USD 500million in compensation to
over 120,000 victims since August 2001 In the UK we are building
systems to manage Part-time Workers Pensions Access claims and
we have been instrumental in establishing the John Palmer action
group which plans to secure compensation for several thousand
timeshare fraud victims.
To date, our experience
in the US has been markedly different to that in the UK. The UK
legal infrastructure does not have a good history of turning legal
victories into mass compensation awards - in short it is usually
difficult to provide the necessary impetus and structure required
to facilitate real access to justice in such cases - i.e. making
sure that the all eligible victims receive compensation cost effectively.
Whilst of course there have been claims that have succeeded, there
has been a long history of failed mass actions in the British
Courts. The list starts withthe Benzodiazapine litigation (£40M
spent on legal aid and not a single person paid out) and continues
through severalother failed claims where tens of millions of Pounds
of legal and administrative fees have yet to translate into meaningful
compensation payments despite several
years of work. These include:
- Vibration White
Finger
- Asbestos - both
the public sector old British Coal liabilities and the successful
private sector actions e.g Iron Trades and Cape
- Pharmaceutical
Equally,
the self-regulation and occasional fine put in place regarding
instances of financial insitution misconduct (e.g. pensions misselling,
can one really argue that the compensation paid out really reflects
the profits made from this practice?) seem at best half baked
and provide little comfort that the growing list of wide-scale
misconduct will be dealt with in any
sensible, cost-effective or equitable way - e.g.
- Mortgage endowments
- Split Caps
- Guaranteed Income
bonds
It
appears primarily that mass litigation in the UK tends
not to be commercially driven - or perhaps better put, end-driven;
the end being the successful claimant receiving equitable compensation
rather than a positive judgementAfter all, claimants sue for money
and not for being proven right. In the US this is certainly the
case, as the lawyers' fees in a class action are usually structured
as a percentage of the award amount and as such the lawyers interests
are significantly aligned with those of the plaintiff. Equally,
costs are borne by each side so it is in the interests of the
lawyers to keep their own costs under control and spend their
time and resources as effectively as possible. Some might argue
that this will encourage lawyers to pursue opportunitistic claims
using opportunistic methods. But remunerating lawyersbased purely
upon the hours worked rather than the result achieved (incl. "no
win no fee" or legal aid arrangements) does not in itself
preclude this sort of behaviour.
- An institutional dislike
of "litigiousness" amongst many lawyers and policy
makers. There is a fairly strong feeling in government that
"too many people claim for too much" in the US, and
that this is a road down which we do not want to travel;
- The strong influence of the
general insurers. As everyone realises, and only in part as
a result of their own doing, general insurance is going through
a torrid time at the moment because (a) their investments have
suffered with the falls in the stock market, and (b) the number
of people making claims (especially in the personal injury market)
has grown vastly in recent years. Whilst there is no doubt that
the vast majority of these claims are genuine, the effect on
the insurance companies of the rise of "no win, no fee"
claims has been to increase their exposures greatly (and in
many cases for old claims the insurers thought they could put
behind them). They have little choice (except when solvency
rules are relaxed) but to pass these increased costs on to their
policyholders via premium hikes. Insurers also have a natural
inclination to blame increasing claims rather than bad investment
returns and/or management for these premium rate increases.
Thus, the Department of Trade and Industry (which represents
both the insurers along with the Treasury and the businesses
who pay premiums) and the Department of Transport (which represents
the premium paying motorists) are heavy lobbyists against any
measures which could increase civil claims;
-
The Government
also has an interest in discouraging or at least not assisting
class actions as it has significant exposure in a number of
areas - both direct liabilities - e.g. MOD personal injury
claims, asbestos, army pensions, Gurkha equal pay, SERPs,
Expat Pensions, Widowers Benefits, Railtrack and indirect
ones where, for example, it may allegedly have failed in its
regulatory duties (split caps, Equitable Life, Independent
Insurance ….);
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- The inherent conservatism
of the legal profession - most lawyers, especially the more reputable
ones, would say they have no need to work on a contingency basis.
Furthermore, legal aid is still available to certain cases where
a wider public good is recognized - however lawyers are neither
incentivised nor obliged to ensure that this "wider good"
is attained in the event of success. Furthermore, partnerships
are poor structures for managing risks (especially potential contingent
liabilities such as adverse costs), barristers are rarely in position
to run a portfolio of cases which could enable them to absorb
more risky/contingency based fee structures. Additionally, UK
lawyers - unlike their US cousins - do not have the in-house resources
to cope with the logistics of mass claims and/or are not used
to outsourcing this work to experts like us;
- Few firms (if
any) to date have had real success in attaining a financially
meaningful class action victory and those firms most active in
this area have tended to be an instrument for pursuing smaller
(i.e. hundreds rather than tens of thousands) personal injury
or discrimination cases. It is interesting to note that in the
US the class action market was kick-started by securities actions
(debt and shareholder) and this market has yet to take off in
the UK. True, the Railtrack class action could set a precedent
if successful with nearly 50,000 members signed up - but even
here it seems to the outsider that this is being driven as much
by a dislike of Stephen Byers, together with a strong feeling
of being short-changed, rather than a calculated decision that
a class action is a sensible commercial punt - i.e. the investment
required over a given period versus the potential return in the
event of success justifies the speculative risk of litigation.
This is, of course, not a refection on the legal merits of that
particular case, nor indeed any other, but rather a comment on
the differences between the UK securities class action lawyer
and his US counterpart, who would be focused entirely on returns
and as such would be prepared to fund the action as required in-house;
- Lack of external
funding. The fact that the law of champerty precludes third party
funding reduces significantly the ability of lawyers to act commercially
(including syndicating risk) or for claimants to pursue actions
using money other than their own. Even "no fee no win"
agreements leave uncovered and expensive costs (insurance, counsel,
expert and court fees) to be met;
- The willingness
of the British public to put up with abuse without seeking recourse
or compensation except in exceptional or very obvious circumstances.
This is not helped by the difficulty in identifying and getting
potential class members to opt in to group actions and the fear
of adverse cost exposure. No better example of this exists that
the current mortgage endowment misselling debacle - we are met
with almost total disbelief when we describe the current situation
to a US class action lawyers and point out that no serious legal
action has yet been instigated in the UK.
Some
may argue that the lack of US-style litigousness in the UK is
a good thing - arguments such as this are often supported by much
favoured but misleading (because these are the exceptions and
not the rules) examples of excessive awards across the Atlantic.
The very specific issue of punitive damages is often the most
frequent point of focus for British detractors. This attitude
frequently leads to sophistry - e.g. a woman in the US is awarded
$28 billion compensation for smoking-related diseases - therefore
all US-style or even mass compensation is bad.
There
is no question in my mind, as someone who works on both sides
of the Atlantic on complex mass claims, that US citizens have
far better access to justice than their UK counterparts and that
US companies, accordingly, are better at handling their liabilities
(both after the event and pre-emptively) - which must be a good
thing. If we do feel that increasing access to justice in UK is
a good idea for genuine victims as opposed to opportunists, what
we need to do is look at the US system with an open mind and analyse
how it is possible in the UK to reduce the administrative costs
associated with compensation claims by ensuring that actions and
their settlements are properly managed.
It
is possible to do this, to an extent, using the existing infrastructure
in the UK as evidenced by our role in the John Palmer action (www.irwinmitchell.co.uk)
which has the key characteristics that make a mass action viable
in the UK - i.e.:
- sufficient number
of identifiable victims (potentially 17,000);
- clear case of liability;
- clear commercial
logic both for the victims, the lawyers and FRA; and
- a well funded defendant
- i.e. one who can afford to pay compensation.
We
see that similar opportunities exist in the UK especially in securities
class actions (as per the Railtrack action) where the claimant population
can be identified via the share/bond-holder registry, where the
defendants are in sufficient numbers to mitigate/minimize adverse
costs exposure and where the defendants themselves are creditworthy
and/or have insurance.
In summary, the UK is a long way from the US and all too often genuine
victims cannot afford to pursue genuine cases. A good example of
this is the Annette Carson case where, to a layman, it would appear
that a strong case exists against the Government - i.e. ex-patriot
pensioners should have their pensions universally indexed as opposed
to selectively and based purely upon their current country of residence.
In this case Mrs. Carson is, I assume, a rather underfunded (especially
so as her pension is not indexed!) South African-based pensioner
fighting the rather better funded UK Government. Having lost the
first court case, she was hit with a GBP160,000 adverse costs award
- she has thankfully been given the right to appeal. Given that
there are an estimated ½ million people in Mrs. Carson's
position one would think there is strength in numbers as well as
in the principles of her legal case - surely "civilized
values" would dictate that Mrs. Carson's case should be pursued
on a more level playing field. 

Toby
Duthie is one of the three co-founders of FRA. Projects he has or
continues to be involved in include:
- The
multi-billion pound Part-time Workers Pensions access project
where he is working with Unison to manage several thousand claims.
- The
USD1.25 billion "Nazi Gold" Swiss Bank Settlement where
FRA developed and implemented to IT systems required to value,
validate and payout up to 30,000 claims in respect of Holocaust-era
assets.
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